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The struggle over land and over labour has been the driving force of
South African history. Its power-house, at least for the last hundred
years, has been the immense concentration of economic resources on the Rand.
By the early twentieth century these had subordinated the whole of Southern
Africa to their demands, leaving virtually no corner of the sub-continent
untouched. The centrality of this gold mining complex to the South African
economy, along with the sheer scale of the social engineering that
accompanied its rise has tended to engross the attention of economists and
historians. Contradictions between the needs of different sectors of the
economy have been conceptualised in terms of conflicts between agriculture,
industry and gold, and while efforts have been made to disaggregate the
former two sectors, there has been an implicit but almost universal equation
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of mining with the Rand. Yet mining was far more diversified then this.
Diamonds, coal, asbestos, platinum, and other centres of gold production all
made significant contributions to 'mining's' fortunes in the twentieth
3
century, although none have received more than cursory attention. Most of
these other sectors moreover experienced even more acute profitability
problems than gold which were often either nade up of or compounded by the
magnetic pull of the Rand. Real contradictions thus emerged within the
mining sector which have been either overlooked or ignored. In the coal
mines of Natal and the Transvaal, for example, the ruling prices of coal
ensured that profit margins were even more slender than those existing for
gold. Gold mines in Southern-Rhodesia were likewise disadvantaged compared
with their more favoured neighbours further south. Ore bodies were
irregular and scattered and subject to erratic fluctuations in grade, which
inhibited larger-scale exploitation and left the companies that worked them
2.
in a perpetually vulnerable position. Both industries responded by
depressing the wages of black workers to rates substantially below those
ruling on the Rand, and by shaving costs in the provision of accommodation,
food, health and safety to dangerously low levels. The outcome was
predictable. Labour dried up, as it was siphoned off to the higher paying
4
regions of the Rand.
To 'capture' labour which would otherwise drift to the Rand both
industries had to resort to varying degrees of coercion or sharp practice.
In Southern Rhodesia, where the mines had the benefit of privileged access
to a separate state apparatus, the chibaro system was installed. Agents of
the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau scoured the country for labour, either
forcibly rounding up peasants, or pouncing on those who were trying to make
their way to the higher wage zones further south. Once captured such
unfortunates were forced to sign a 12 month labour contract, and eke out a
miserable existence on the mines. In the northern Natal coal mines a more
insidious and corrosive system was employed. Workers were encouraged to
live on neighbouring farms and were deliberately enmeshed in a system of
debt bondage operating through the 'token' credit system. Many never
escaped. Wives and children left behind at their homes became, in the words
of Chief Robert Kunene of Boschhoek, 'widows and orphans while their
[husbands and] fathers are yet alive'. An important adjunct of the Natal
coal-fields system was the freedom it allowed to miners to cohabit with
women on neighbouring farms. A similar practice was followed in the Witbank
coal-fields of the Transvaal. Although enjoying access to the recruiting
monopsony of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, the Witbank mines still
experienced shortages of labour because of the lower wages they paid. They
therefore encouraged the informal stabilisation of the Shangane section of
their labour force by allowing their wives and 'unattached' women to settle
nearby. Beer brewing and prostitution were consequently common but this was
3.
a price the mine managers were prepared to pay. As Chamber of Mines
representative Mr. Bennett confessed to the Native Laws Enquiry Commission
in 1947, 'The reason why the coal mines bring the natives and their families
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there is because they can't get them on the migratory system1. The
Vereeniging Estates took this practice to its logical conclusion by
attempting to draw labour for its coal mines from the squatter-tenant
population resident on its farms. For reasons which are not entirely
clear, this effort largely failed, and it was left to another sector of
mining - the eastern Transvaal gold fields at Pilgrim's Rest - to develop
this particular captive labour system in its most imaginative and systematic
form. It is to this that the rest of this paper now turns.
THE TGME AND THE COMPANY TOWN
From the mid 1890s gold mining in the Pilgrim's Rest area was dominated
by two major concerns, the Transvaal Gold Mining Estates, and its allied
company Glynns Lydenburg. Of these the TGME was by far the larger
enterprise operating the great bulk of the mines and owning freehold title
to 32 farms. Although the two companies dominated 'the principal of the
(Transvaal) Colony's gold fields away from the Rand' they were completely
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overshadowed by these rivals in the southern Transvaal. As with the
Southern Rhodesian gold mines, mining in Pilgrim's Rest was a particularly
hazardous and unpredictable exercise. Ore bodies ranged from vertical to
horizontal, and they frequently folded and faulted. Narrow reefs and the
limited lateral extent of the ore bodies demanded that a great deal of
development be undertaken to yield a smalll quantity of ore. Erratic
deposits together with the variable grade of ore, which spanned 7 to 18 dwts,
made evaluation uncertain. All this combined with soft ground and the
refractory nature of the ore to render mining in Pilgrim's Rest 'a
10geological jigsaw puzzle1. Transport and climate posed a number of other
4.
problems. Even once the railway reached Graskop in 1914, supplies still had
to be hauled over steep gradients for the last of twelve miles to Pilgrim's
Rest. In neither winter nor summer could such haulage be guaranteed. Cold
weather in winter repeatedly incapacitated the oxen, while in summer months
heavy rain frequently turned the roads into quagmires or completely swept
them away. Floods inundated Pilgrim's Rest in 1909, 1914, 1918, 1919,
121925 and 1939 sometimes bringing mining to a total halt. In 1909 a
cloudburst swept every bridge away, destroyed Jubilee Power station,
'practically drowned out Elandsdrift mine1 for 6 weeks, closed the central
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mill for 2 months and claimed 15 black lives. In February 1918 heavy rain
caused flooding and numerous cave-ins, and again brought mining operations
to a halt. In March 1925 torrential downpours collapsed workings in many
14
mines, and affected Vaalhoek in particular for several months.
Intervening droughts, while providing labour, also created periodic power
supply scares, since the company relied on the hydro-electric energy
15provided by the nearby Blyde River. In March 1921 Pilgrim's Rest was even
visited by its own cyclone which bore off the Vaalhoek mine offices and
1 fi
swept every sheet of its records away.
Such geological and environmental hazards made mining in Pilgrim's Rest
a precarious business, and ensured that control over costs and human labour,
would, if anything, be more important than on the Rand. The company's
solution to these problems was a South African variant of that practised
elsewhere. It secured a company estate, on which it built a company town.
The first was aimed primarily at securing an adequate supply of black
labour. The second was directed towards imposing a similar grid of controls
over Pilgrim's Rest's white population. It is to the latter that we shall
first turn.
Five days after the sinking of the Lusitania on 7 May 1913, riots broke
out in Pilgrim's Rest. Their targets were German shops of which many were
5.
sacked and burnt, but as is common with outbursts of this kind, the riots
17
gave expression to more deep-seated grievances and discontents. Prominent
among these was the tight grip kept on the town's 900 plus white population
by the TGME, and at one remove by Rand Mines, by whom the TGME were
controlled. Although Rand Mines had its head offices in London and drew
most of its capital from that source, it had a tenuous German connection
through the person of Hermann Eckstein, and it was this linkage which gave
Pilgrim•s Rest's white residents the opportunity to launch an indirect
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attack on the company through the looting of German shops.
The first moves of the Vigilance Association which was formed
immediately after the riots exposes this hidden and maybe only half
articulated agenda. In a letter of appeal to the Governor-General of South
Africa, the Association protested that
The conditions of living in this town are unique, and quite
unparalleled in any other town which boasts the protection of that
emblem of freedom, the British Flag. There is no local
self-governing body, a system of which Your Excellency is so staunch
a supporter; our destinies are entirely in the hands, and subject of
the whims of the chief representative of the Transvaal Gold Mining
Estates, ...
Not only was the system of government by the company
autocratic and despotic, [but], both freedom of speech and freedom of
action have been discouraged in the sternest manner in years past,
ejections from the town having taken place in punishment of some who
had the temerity to displease the company. So much has the company
terrorised the inhabitants, that it would take years of freedom from
the yoke to eradicate the impression that the company is all
supreme.
The Vigilance Association went on to itemise a long list of complaints: the
failure of the company to provide sanitary facilities or to establish a
health board, even though the company collected between £2 000 and £3 000
per annum from rents; insecurity of tenure; restrictions on who might
settle in the village, excessive electricity, water and housing rents, the
confiscation of immovable property erected on company ground without
compensation to the owner, and control over the local press. In the
6.
residents' minds, the 'octopus like tentacles' [sic] of the TGME
'constituted a serious menace' in the district and rendered living in
21
Pilgrim's Rest 'almost tantamount to a state of slavery1
The residents' appeals made scant impression. The Governor General's
office acknowledged that it was 'well known that the TGME carry on affairs
with a high hand at Pilgrim's Rest', but took no further action on account
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of the war. The residents met with equally little success in their
efforts to have an official township proclaimed at Pilgrim's Rest. In
February 1916 a proclamation by Government Gazette allowed for a township to
be proclaimed, but then the whole exercise bogged down. According to the
TGME's General Manager, R.A. Barry, 'legal difficulties barred the way' but
if the Comapany's previous record is anything to judge by one can not
23discount the company's own hidden hand. A few concessions were admittedly
won by the residents, but for the most part were of a relatively trifling
kind: a Health Committee was formed which the General Manager recognised,
water rates were cut by half, and the company was induced to make a small
24
contribution towards building a recreation park. But on all the major
issues the company won hands down.
The residents were not much better served by the chief workplace
representative - the miners' worker's union. Barry categorically rejected a
closed shop on TGME, and would neither recognise nor extend to Pilgrim's
Rest the agreements reached between Chamber of Mines and the mineworkers on
25
the Rand. As a result, in 1919 white miners were paid less than those on
the Reef in 1916 despite the intervening period of massive inflation, while
overtime rates were paid well below the standard time and a half. The
miners were routed equally comprehensively on the question of racial ratios,
the average being anything from 1:20 to 1:36 in Pilgrim's Rest compared to
271:8 on the Rand. The dismal record of the union can partly be explained
by the 'entirely different' conditions which Barry so frequently invoked,
7,
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but other factors played an equally important part. 'Local men ... of
decent stock' seem to have been especially favoured by TGME presumably
because they were in one way or another 'tied' to the region, and less
29likely to cause trouble. So too were 'first stage Phthisis men from the
30
Rand', the reasons being more or less the same. Strictly speaking the
company should not have been allowed to employ such workers after the
passage of the Phthisis Act of 1919. However so loud were its protests, and
so successfully had it become accepted as a law unto itself that it was able
31
to elude the net of even this piece of legislation.
Pilgrim's Rest did not possess the full attributes of a company town -
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probably few 'company' towns ever did. There was no payment in scrip and
no company store; nor could the TGME totally control access to the town or
shut off access to the state. Nevertheless the TGME did own the town - its
stores, its houses, its churches, hospitals and schools - and could make
life so unpleasant for its opponents, as to hold an effective power of
exclusion. Moreover, its domination of the areas' economy gave it
tremendous leverage over the local officers of the state. Except through
spontaneous bouts of Germano-phobia few therefore dared challenge its
commands. The Company extended an analogous network of controls over the
black workers on its mines, but despite boasting ostensibly even more
formidable powers over these workers it ultimately met with less success.
It is to these efforts that this paper now turns.
THE TGME AND THE COMPANY ESTATE
When the application of the Phthisis Act to the Pilgrim's Rest gold
fields had originally been contemplated the General Manager, Barry, had
immediately fired back the retort: 'the result would be disastrous. Costs
would be increased so as to imperil the possibility of working the mines at
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all'. In this case Barry was probably bluffing, but there was no such room
8.
for overstatement as far as the costs of African labour were concerned. It
was this problem that the company estate was designed to resolve. When the
TGME was incorporated in 1895, it brought together not only the gold rights
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to 6 auriferous farms, but also the freehold rights to a further 32 more.
On these lived a substantial black population which the company envisaged
putting to work on its mines. In 1898 the Company sought to regularise its
position by seeking exemption from the 1895'Plakkers Wet1which prohibited
the residence of unemployed Africans on white owned land. The black
population, the company requested, should be allowed to remain 'on condition
that they work for a portion of the year in the service of this company'.
The ZAR Government assented, and thus armed, the company was able to boast
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of an ample supply of labour in 1899. It was on this basis that the
company was able to expand its operations in the years following the Anglo
Boer War. Black homestead heads were given rights to cultivate the land on
the farms in return for the payment of £1 a year rent, £1 for each extra
wife (plus sundry minor charges), and the performance of 6 'tickets' of 30
shifts on the TGME mines. The latter was invariably represented as the
obligation to work 6 months for the company, but in practice it meant
spending appreciably, longer on the mines, since the mines closed down
operations on Sundays and this alone added on almost an extra month. If the
experience of other districts is anything to judge by it probably took 1YZ to
8 months to work off the requisite number of shifts, imposing a much heavier
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work burden than was immediately apparent.
The TGME was also able to derive other advantages from such an
immediately accessible labour pool - it could acquire its tenants' sons'
labour. According to the Mining Commissioner for Lydenburg District, W.
Dyke Poynter, forty to fifty per cent of the TGME's 3 000 workers were under
18 years of age. The employment of juvenile labour enabled the company to
accomplish a radical reduction of costs. Not only could these boys be paid
9.
at a much lower rate than adult men, but they would also work much narrower
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stopes. Since the cost of mining was calculated, in part, according to
the amount of rock that had to be mined to extract an ounce of gold, the
narrowing of stopes could involve a massive saving in costs. Acting
Director of Native Labour, H.S. Cooke, was later to exclaim on the
'extraordinarily small dimensions of TGME's stopes1 which were commonly
opened up to only 15-18 inches, and upon such narrow widths of stopes often
depended the very existence of the mines. As TGME's General Manager, R.A.
Barry, explained 'Many workings ... are ... not large enough to admit any
40but quite small boys and if enlarged would become unpayable'.
One last advantage conferred by the company estate was the attraction
it exerted on labour from Mozambique. Under the 'modus vivendi' agreement
entered into by the Union of South Africa and the government of Mozambique
in 1901, no Mozambiquan male was able to enter into a mining contract in
South Africa except through the agency of the Witwatersrand Native Labour
Association (WNLA). The only exemption to this arrangement was made in
favour of the district of Maputo and this the TGME soon learned to
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exploit. The company's farms lay relatively close to the Mozambiquan
border, and substantial numbers of Mozambquans soon stole across to seek
work on the TGME mines. The arrangement hald advantages for both the
company and the workers. For the company MDzambiquan workers not only made
up a substantial proportion of the workforce but also helped stabilise their
labour complement at a strategic time of the year. Between October and
January the company always experienced an exodus of labour as its tenants
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went home to plough their farms. It was precisely at this time that
Mozambiquan workers chose to return to the mines, thereby easing (though not
solving) this recurrent constriction of labour supply. For Mozambiquan
workers the arrangement had a double attraction. They could use the
Pilgrim's Rest mines as a staging post to the Rand or they could marry local
10.
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women and settle on company land. Permanent settlement of this kind seems
to have occurred on an increasingly large scale, and even embraced Nyasa
workers over time. According to J.E.d.l.c. Travers' evidence to the Eastern
Transvaal Land Commission of 1918 there was a substantial Shangane
population in the district, most of which had come from Mozambique over the
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previous 20 years. Almost identical evidence was tendered by the
Assistant Native Commissioner at Graskop to the Native Economic Commission
some 13 years later. 'Large numbers of clandestine immigrants' had arrived
from both Mozambique and Nyasaland over the previous decade who survivied by
46
mining or agricultural work. It seems likely that the TGME turned a blind
eye to the origins of their labour, although the evidence is sparse.
According to Christian Silikane, Shanganes 'only had a problem later after
their chief demanded the return of his subjects' and 'the Portuguese wanted
them to pay their taxes', while the company's official attitude was that
'when traced, the Portuguese authorities are informed, and tax collected1.
'When traced' was probably the significant proviso, and many Mozambiquan
47
immigrants almost certainly escaped the net.
Blessed with relatively varied and flexible sources of labour, TGME was
able to pay its workers considerably less than the going rate on the Rand.
In December 1918 TGME's Elandsdrift mines paid an average of l/3d a shift or
48£1.18.0. per month as compared with an average 2/2d per shift or £3.05.0.
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a month on the Rand at the time. Juvenile labour was of course paid
appreciably less. The company estate was indeed a sound investment for
the mines.
THE TGME AND THE NATIVE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
The TGME could not have derived such benefits from its estate without
some degree of official acquiescence. A familiar feature of the company
town is the absence or atrophy of state authority, and for much of this
11.
period Pilgrim's Rest existed insulated from any effective government
control. Local officials occasionally sought to intervene in some or other
TGME related matter, but once stirred, soon relapsed into helpless
inactivity when faced with the broadsides of criticism which such action
invariably evoked. As the Native Commissioner for Lydenburg later confided,
the 'Mining community ... [was] always anxious to get a hold upon the
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officials' and if thwarted were liable to engage in vituperate personal
attacks. R.A. Barry, General Manager from 1915 to 1930, was particularly
adept at exerting this kind of pressure, despatching hectoring letters to
whoever dared cross him, or orchestrating vicious campaigns in the TGME
owned press.
The central authorities were if anything even more inclined to leave
the TGME well alone. Pilgrim's Rest was too remote, and the mining magnates
too crossed to invite close attention to its affairs. Only when major
scandals erupted was the government spurred into action, but even then a
standard sequence of events would ensue. Culprits would be excused if not
exonerated, minor reforms would be made and once the immediate furore had
subsided, official attention would quietly lapse.
In most matters the TGME was therefore left to do much as it liked. The
Native Labour Regulation Act (No. 15) of 1911, for example, which was the
first systematic attempt to regulate recruitment and terms of service of
black labour in South Africa left the Pilgrim's Rest district more or less
untouched. Section 4 of the Act which prohibited the recruitment of
rent-paying tenants by landlords was quietly ignored (53). Even when H.S.
Cooke, the Acting Director of Native Labour was despatched to Pilgrim's Rest
in December 1918 to examine complaints and accusations flying between the
company and local officials, he contented himself with the bland observation
that 'there is no arrangement with this department in view of the definition
of recruiting under the Act in terms of Section 4 of the Act1 and left the
12.
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matter at that. Provision for the registration of workers was equally
lax. Soon after the 1911 Act was passed regulations were made which allowed
for the voluntary recruitment and the voluntary registration of labourers,
the onus for each falling on the labourer and employer respectively.
Employers in the Pilgrim's Rest area however would not avail themselves of
this facility, partly because of the 1/- fee that was demanded, but mainly,
it would seem, because it would expose them to official surveillance. Freed
of any official control, employer abuses mounted and by 1912 the new
sub-Native Commissioner Cross was reporting increasing numbers of cases of
the withholding of wages and the flogging of tenants to force them out to
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work. The Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg responded by framing
new regulations in 1913 which made provision for compelling such employers
to register labourers in their employment and to pay a 1/- fee. At this
point however familiar pressures began to make themselves felt. When Cross
proposed to proclaim Pilgrim's Rest a labour area in terms of the new
regulations he was bombarded with complaints from employers about the
difficulty of registering workers spread over such a large area, and, on the
grounds of practical difficulties, the Director of Native Labour backed off.
The abuses continued, the TGME now assuming the role of leading culprit, as
it sent out its mine police to flog recalcitrant tenants living on its
estate. Exactly how long this persisted or who was involved is unclear. In
May 1915 the Estate Manager of TGME was protesting in injured tones that
these assaults had ceased 16 months before, but three years later Colonel
Truter, the Commissioner of Police was still claiming that the police had
57been requested 'to flog natives and burn their huts'. Whatever the
precise details, the Department of Native Affairs was once again shaken of
its inertia, and the Secretary for Native Affairs was despatched to
investigate the matter. As a result of his visit another approach was
tried. A new and more determined sub-native commissioner (Hemsworth) was
13.
despatched to the Graskop office with instructions to enforce the provisions
of the pass laws, and to oblige all employers to keep a register of
workers. The system had worked well in nearby Barberton, but here it
scarcely got off the ground. Hemsworth was immediately the target of abuse.
Excoriated by Barry and 'howled down1 in the local press, he soon deemed it
wiser to retire to the front. The Director of Native Affairs, now suddenly
appraised of the unavailability of suitable staff, cited practical
59
difficulties and ordered a fresh retreat.
Hemsworth's replacement, J.C. Arbous, was a man more suited to Barry's
tastes. He was junior, he was inexperienced, and he was insecure: he
compensated by confining himself almost exclusively to the collection of
tax. This he did with unexampled vigour, embarking on a virtual campaign of
terror to swell the level of receipts. Lashing of poll tax defaulters
occurred on almost a daily basis, with as many as six being lashed at a
time. The lashes '[were] inflicted with a piece of heavy old harness trace
about 3 feet 6 inches long, nailed onto a heavy kaffir stick about 18
linches long1. Besides this, his assistant H.G. Soames recorded, the
stirrup leather used by his predecessor Hemsworth for such purposes was 'a
. , , 60joke1•
The flogging of poll tax defaulters was technically illegal, without
the matter having been brought to the attention of the magistrate first. So
too was the arrest of wives of tax defaulters until their defaulting
husbands paid up. It was illegalities such as these, along with a range of
other minor misdemeanours such as assisting labour touts to recruit arrested
tax defaulters, which prompted H.G. Soames, Arbous' assistant temporatry
clerk to expose his activities in the Natal press. Writing under the title
'Black Justice' Soames1 indictment proved so powerful that it prompted
Secretary of Native Affairs John X. Merriman to order a magisterial
enquiry. In the five day hearing that followed Soames' accusations were
14.
found to be substantially correct, although the investigating magistrate
went to great lengths to find mitigating factors to excuse Arbous' misdeeds.
The flogged defaulters, the magistrate argued, were extravagantly in
arrears, in one instance as far back as the Anglo-Boer war; the flogging of
women was 'not severe'; aiding labour recruiters was 'an established
practice in the department', and Arbous had not used his position for
personal gain. Yet although the Magistrate was able to pronounce Arbous
neither 'dishonest• or 'cruel' he could not completely absolve him of guilt.
Arbous was 'a victim of the system' but he still had to go. On 24 January
1919 Arbous resigned. Another sub-native commissioner for Pilgrim's Rest
had come to grief.
Alan Barry was not the kind to miss the chance of kicking a man on the
ground, especially if it served to pin the responsibility for labour
problems on somebody else. Having given no previous hint of dissatisfaction
with the acting sub-native commissioner's regime, he now proceeded to rain
blows on the prostrate Arbous. In November 1918, for example, he was the
leading voice in a deputation to the Director of Native Labour which
denounced the office of the sub-native commissioner. Among the central
complaints raised about Arbous and his predecessors was that he was 'in
effect merely a tax collector to the prejudice of his other duties. Instead
of being regarded by the Natives as the Administrator and Father of the
District, they look on him as the man who extorts money from them1. To make
things worse, there was 'no registration of natives, and the (Tax) Register
[was] beyond description and not correct. There was an absolute lack of
business methods as well as lack of staff. Arbous in particular had 'had a
disastrous effect on the District. In the enquiry which was held ... the
man admitted to the flogging of women, etc. which has weakened the hand of
64the white people. Things could not be worse than they are'.
Things certainly were in a sorry state, but slack administration had
15.
been the last thing about which the company had been bothered before: its
principal aim for the past decade had been to keep it as remote and feeble
as possible. As for taxation, this was one of the few administrative
functions in which the company saw any virtue at all. Tax collection drives
which began every March customarily made up the labour deficits with which
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the company was plagued from the beginning of each planting season. Barry
himself made the point in a report to the TGME secretaries in December 1917:
There is a marked shortage in the native labour supply. Every effort
is being made on our part to secure labour but unless the Government
can be induced to bring pressure to bear on the large idle supply of
natives lying below the Berg - which can be done by a vigorous
insistence on the part of the Government in connection with the
payment of taxes due by the natives, - little immediate improvement
can be looked for.
So what now was agitating Barry? Unless he was mouthing pure hypocrisy or
was practising the rankest of opportunism, something had changed.
The key to the company's change of heart was almost certainly the
devastating influenza epidemic which scythed through South Africa's black
and white population in 1918. In Pilgrim's Rest as elsewhere it wrought its
main damage during 'Black October1 1918. From this point forward the
company's fortunes were on the slide. After a decade of boom profits and a
relative abundance of labour, Spanish 'flu ushered in an era of declining
yields, dwindling profits and labour unrest. It was to remedy this
situation that the company now sought the government•s active intervention
and heaped all the blame for current ills on the head of the unfortunate
Arbous.
Spanish 'flu reached Pilgrim's Rest on 14th October 1918. The first
mine to be infected was Ponieskrantz North after the unannounced and
unauthorised visit of 'a boy from Johannesburg'. By 22nd October the
disease had already reached epidemic proportions as the number of cases on
Central Mines swelled from 4 to 500. Three weeks after the outbreak 'drie
dag siekte' had claimed the lives of 50 people at Central Mines, 60 at
16.
Vaalhoek and 70 at Elandsdrift, but even this represented only the tip of
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the iceberg. Countless numbers of others died on the roads and on the
farms. As soon as those infected were able to walk they bolted back to
their homes. Neither the mines nor the local offices of the native
administration had the personnel or the resources to stem the flow. The
make-shift compounds erected on the mines were open and impossible to
control so that parties of workers constantly slipped out in two's and
70
three's. At the height of the epidemic a sudden panic caused wholesale
flight. In a major misjudgment of their credibility R.A. Barry, the General
Manager of TGME, G.A. Whitelaw, the local magistrate, and D. Hook, the new
sub-native commissioner, toured the TGME compounds urging their inmates to
stay and be helped. On the following day 'large numbers of the very ones
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addressed in this manner had flown1. Many were in 'a pitiable state of
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debilitation' and collapsed and died on the roads. Those fortunate enough
to survive all too often set up a new cycle of infection once they reached
home. Christian Silikane who was a young worker at the time still retains a
vivid impression of the scope of the scourge: 'I remember it because when
73it passed I was alive'. July Sedibe confirms the plight of those 'who
tried to run away but died on the road' while for Silikane a gruesome detail
still sticks in his mind. Most of those falling by the wayside 'were eaten
74
by dogs and pigs where they died'.
The epidemic was not only physically debilitating but also had
demoralising psychological effects- No none knew where it came from or
whether it would return (a number of minor outbreaks did subsequently
recur). Rumours spread in an atmosphere charged with uncertainty, which had
already been partly fostered by the war. Christian Silikane 'heard that the
Germans dropped bomb which resulted in the epidemic. After the bomb
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exploded the smell comes over and spreads the disease'. Many still weak
from the disease were consequently reluctant to return. In January 1919 the
17.
TGME was filling only about half of its complement of labour, and by
*7C
February the number had only crept up to about 70%. For three months
prospecting work was entirely halted, and there were labour shortages at
77
Elandsdrift as late as 1920.
With its labour supply shrivelled and its profit margins slashed, the
TGME was faced with the need for some radical re-thinking. The conclusion
it reached was the need for a major stiffening of support from the state.
Barry went about achieving this goal in his usual peremptory and domineering
manner. He hectored Whitelaw and Hook 'to exert what authority they
[could]' to restore labour and stop desertion, and when Whitelaw was not
sufficiently responsive, he complained directly to the Secretary for Native
Affairs, and began a campaign to have the administration of African labour
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amended 'in every direction'. Although Barry could not have known it at
the time, this was to be the watershed in the TGME's fortunes, as the
company now entered an era of dislocation and decline. Its effects were
soon felt in the company's system of labour relations, and in the daily
lives of its African tenants, but before proceeding to that it is first
necessary to look at the 'under' side of the company's labour relations in
this period of plenty, since without having a firmer grasp of that, it is
difficult to comprehend the changes that followed.
THE TGME AND ITS GOLDEN AGE
The 'Golden Age' of the TGME was based on an adequate grade of ore and
a plentiful supply of African labour. While the company could for a time
take the former for granted, its supply of labour was always potentially
subject to serious fluctuations: it was presumably only the dimmest of the
company's shareholders that had to be reminded in the 1912 Company Report
that 'the future success of your company's operations depends almost
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entirely on an adequate supply of unskilled labour'. To secure the steady
18.
supply of labour that was so vital to its operations the company was
prepared to twist the arms of local officials and to apply a range of other
physical sanctions to wayward tenants on its farms, yet what conferred a
degree of stability on the company's labour supply in this period was not
just coercion but also a measure of acquiscence and consent. Consent was
contrived through the interaction of a number of factors some of which the
company perhaps did not fully grasp itself. Key among these was the
facility to desert. By common consent desertion was rife on the TGME mines.
When Acting Director of Native Labour, H.S. Cooke, undertook an
investigation of the TGME's labour problems in December 1918 he discovered
that 'few mines require the production of a travelling pass when a native is
engaged', and found 'no case of it being retained during the contract1.
In the absence of an official system of registration, this meant that
desertion could take place virtually unchecked.
The term desertion, in this context, conveys what may be a slightly
misleading or overstated impression. 'Facility for desertion' was no doubt
'the only safeguard which the native ha[d] for decent treatment1 as the
Mining Commissioner for Pilgrim's Rest insisted in 1919, but there are
indications that for much of the time desertions were not quite such self
consciously corrective or desperate acts. Cooke noted in the report
mentioned earlier that 'desertions were reported in only a small number of
cases and when natives who have deserted resume employment even after long
abscences the offence is condoned and the wages earned up to the time of the
Op
desertion are paid as a matter of course'. Desertions in such instances
thus seem to have been a rather casual affair, indulged in for routine
agricultural needs or family affairs. At one point in the agricultural
cycle this was certainly the case, for the TGME's recruitment from its farms
almost invariably plummetted in the ploughing season between October and8 3
January each year.
19.
Desertion of this kind was but one aspect of the latitude and
flexibility induced in the TGME's labour regime as a result of the close
association of farms and places of work. It was almost certainly this close
proximity (as well as the blind eye of the Department of Native Affairs)
which encouraged the employment of youths. One reason why it has been
possible in this study to interview men who had worked on the TGME mines in
the late 1910s and early 1920s has been because they began working so young.
Their recollections help explain why juvenile labour was so widely condoned.
July Sedibe, for example, started work in 1920 at the age of 14-16 on the
TGME's Duke Hill mine. Sedibe lived on Vaalhoek farm which was some
distance from the mine, and used to return to his family's homestead each
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week-end, after the mine had knocked off on Saturday at 1.00 p.m.
Christian Silikane began work in 1919 at the age of 12-15. His job was
leading mules: other children worked on machines, on 'plank-stopes• or
lashed (i.e. shovelled rock). Silikane lived sufficiently close to the mine
to go home every night, and remembers working 'into the night1 in order to
knock off on Saturday at 11.00 a.m. or 12.00 noon. Tiger Mashile began
his working life a year earlier in 1918 on Ponieskrantz mine. His first job
was on a ventilating machine which he tended from 7.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m.
without a break. He received 'a tickey a day'. He later graduated to
lashing, and remembers working the same uninterrupted hours on narrow
cramped stopes. Like Silikane, Mashile returned home each night, and he
recalls many workers at other mines doing the same. At Waterval, Ledouphine
and Bourkes' Luck men travelled by bicycle to work, the more energetic or
Of:
family-minded leaving at 3.00 or 4.00 in the morning to arrive in time.
Clearly, such proximity, and the capacity to return relatively often to the
family homestead, must have served to diffuse opposition to those youngsters
working on the mines. A measure of protection could still be afforded by
the family, while both elders and juniors derived mutual gain. The young
20.
boys could earn money to buy clothes, minor luxuries and cattle, while the
family could displace some of its labour obligations on to the shoulders of
the young.
Those boys who lived in the compounds during the week, shared huts
specially set aside for the youth, in which three would normally bed down.
By contrast to the Rand, these living quarters were open and largely
uncontrolled. The TGME's attitude in the matter was dictated mainly by
cost. The huts were built by the workers themselves, and no facilities were
provided besides food. As sub-native commissioner D. Hook observed early in
1919, 'the tendency [has been] to philosophically accept the aboriginal
labourer as a working force, pay, and feed, him, but for the rest to allow
him to come and go at leisure, and to solve for himself such vital questions
as housing, sanitation, etc.1. This relative freedom of the compounds
proved a major drawcard for the TGME's workforce, and provided partial
compensation for the lower wages they earned as compared to the Rand.
Workers could 'flit around as they liked1 grumbled Barry, as he vented his
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newly-found sense of grievance at government inaction in November 1918.
They could live their lives to some extent as they chose. Workers were also
free in other ways. Wives could stay with their husbands in the huts, and
since the company made little effort to verify marriages, other women were
smuggled in at will. 'Mapulanas, Pedis, Sranganes ... women who didn't have
90
money' thronged into the compounds. Many brewed beer which they hid in
91
adjacent forests; others engaged in quasi- or 'open prostitution'. Among
'the hundreds of women who [left] their families [in the Pilgrim's Rest
92
district] preferring a loose life in the compounds' many seem to have
ventured no further than the TGME mines.
Access to women and to beer added further lustre to the mines at
Pilgrim's Rest, especially for the Mozambiquans and Nyasas who began to make
up an increasingly significant part of the company's labour force. While
21.
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many used Pilgrim's Rest as a staging post to the Rand others became
ensnared by these casual pleasures, and stayed more or less permanently in
the compounds of the TGME. Nyasa workers were supposed to have held a
94
peculiarly fatal 'fascination' for local women, which led to much trouble.
Their local reputation for 'stabbing one another' perhaps reflects this
95prowess. When loose liaisons with local women matured into more permanent
relationships, the male partners sometimes secured access to land on the
farms, thereby adding impulse to the cycle out of which the liaison
96
originally sprang. More immigrants meant less land for the existing
inhabitants, more poverty, less polygamy, and less capacity to provide for
or control the younger daughters in the family home. The process of
domestic dissolution was gathering pace.
One last attraction which may have arisen from the sprawling and
informal character of Pilgrim's Rest's compounds was a lower rate of
mortality than that prevailing on the Rand. When H.S. Cooke undertook his
investigation of TGME in December 1918 he expressed shock at the standard of
accommodation provided by the mines: the huts were too small, there was no
running water, and santiary arrangements were either 'primitive or
non-existant1: His overall impression was one of 'squalor and
97discomfort1. R.A. Barry made a surprisingly feeble attempt to defend his
company against these charges, arguing, among other things that 'improved
types [of hut] have been tried but it is doubtful whether they are or will
be appreciated' and that 'the porous nature of the walls means that
98
ventilation is better than on the Rand1. However, Pilgrim's Rest's Mining
Commissioner put up a more spirited defence. While agreeing with Cooke's
strictures on a number of key matters, he took issue with Cooke's rigidly
Rand-centric view of accommodation. 'Living conditions' he argued 'are
excellent', adding that 'scientific compounds would be an absdurdity
99here'. It is difficult to judge between these conflicting opinions, but a
22.
case at least could be made out that it was the relatively lax and informal
conditions at Pilgrim's Rest that so offended Cooke, rather than any lower
standard of health. Whether or not Pilgrim's Rest's compounds were more
healthy than those on the Rand, the TGME mines were certainly safer. Mine
managers congratulated themselves on several occasions on the lower
mortality rates prevailing on their mines as compared to the Rand, and while
this was no doubt due to the different depths at which the mines were being
100
worked, this must have provided a further marginal attraction to workers.
The relative freedom and laxity of the TGME mines clearly softened the
edges of a harsh labour regime, but an even more powerful factor in
manufacturing consent was fairly generous access to land. This had both
material and ideological force. The scanty evidence which we have been able
to gather on this subject suggests that the 1900s and 1910s were a period of
relative prosperity for the TGME's squatter tenants. Over half of the
101
TGME's labour requirements were supplied by the region 'below the Berg1.
Of this a full 50% was drawn from the TGME's 87 000 morgen land-holdings in
the area of Bushbuckridge, much of the remainder coming mostly from nearby
102land company farms. Perhaps the most important company holding farm in
this area was the Transvaal Estate and Development Company, whose manager
painted a picture of relative affluence of his tenants when giving evidence
to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission in 1918. Tenant holdings he
claimed were substantial and the overwhelming majority of homesteads were
103
polygamous, 'many' to the tune of 10 wives. There is no obvious reason
to assume that conditions on the TGME's lowveld farms were much different.
Certainly, evidence for their farms above the Berg, in the neighbourhood of
Pilgrim's Rest, bears out the same impression. July Sedibe, whose father
immigrated from Lekokoto near Nelspruit to a farm named Frankfurt just north
of Pilgrim's Rest, remembers his family ploughing a large plot and reaping
10 bags of maize. He recalls an abundance of cattle at Frankfurt, with most
23.
households owning a plough. As in the lowveld polygamy was common, his own
father marrying two wives by whom were born 8 and 7 children
104
respectively. The chiefly lineage of Mogane paint an even more idyllic
picture, which had no doubt been brought into sharper relief by their recent
105forced removal from the TGME farms. For them, the reign of chief Kobeng,
who died in 1915, was the time of their greatest happiness and prosperity.
Land was ample, they harvested rich crops, and cattle were plentiful.
Ironically, this too was their 'golden age', from which nostalgia tinged
songs still survive, to be sung at festive occasions, - and when the
106
occasional field researcher drops in.
Access to ample acreages of land for the TGME's tenants, and the
proximity of the farms to the mines, underpinned and in a way legitimised
the company's impositions in other respects as well. From a relatively
early stage the company lent heavily on the authority of chief Kobeng to
drum out labour from its Pilgrim's Rest farms. Kobeng's people had lived on
or around what was to become the farm of Hermansburg since the 1850s or
1860s. Kobeng's own collaboration with white authority went back to the
early 1880s if not before. Kobeng is supposed to have assisted the Boers in
the Transvaal's war of retrocession in 1880-1, and certainly provided
sanctuary and succour to Boer commandos in the second Anglo-Boer war.
Tradition has it that it was in return for such assistance that Kobeng was
helped to install himself as chief over his own Mogane rivals, and over the
previously dominant Mashego lineage. Kobeng's co-operation carried over
into the new era of the TGME, when the company resumed full-scale mining
operations in the area after the Anglo-Boer war. As before the arrangement
was to their mutual advantage. In return for helping with the provision of
labour, Kobeng was allowed to enjoy considerable rights. He could allocate
land; he could appoint headmen on other TGME farms; he could hear judicial
cases, and he could organise initiation schools (which lasted a year, and
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which of course inculcated respect for traditional values and obedience to
107the chief). In a more direct way than perhaps anywhere else in South
Africa, the company thus sustained pre-capitalist relations of production,
to provide it with cheap and relatively docile labour power. A version of
the same arrangement may also have been applied to other farms 'below the
Berg1. In 1911, when faced with the first serious labour shortages for
several years, the then General-Manager, Aimetti, invited 35 local chiefs to
Pilgrim's Rest. Arising from their deliberations unspecified but 'very
satisfactory arrangements ... for the control and organisation of our
unskilled labour force1 were made, which, along with a 'judicious
improvement' in rates of pay and rations resolved the company's labour
i oft
problems for several years to come. It was only in a period of mounting
labour shortage and turmoil in the late 1910s that these relationships came
seriously under strain, leading, in the early 1930s, to their total
collapse.
THE TGME UNDER STRAIN
The golden age for both company and labour tenant bagan drawing to a
close in the latter stages of World War I. Between 1911 and 1916 the
company enjoyed its highest profits ever, topping £200 000 in each of these
109years. Henceforth, however, it set itsnlf firmly on its subsequent
110
course of 'increasing tonnage and falling yields'. Between 1921 and 1932
working profit on the mines only three times exceeded £40 000. In 1929
Vaalhoek mine closed down operations and in 1930 the company was predicting
112
a 1-3 year age for a number of the central mines. Compounding the
underlying problem of yield in this period were recurrent labour
difficulties and escalating costs. From 1918 to 1920 the company found
itself in the grips of an acute labour shortage, beginning with the 'flu
epidemic, in October 1918, and culminating in a general strike at Pilgrim's
25.
Rest in June 1920. From 1917, moreover, like other companies in South
113
Africa, it was faced with steeply-rising costs induced by the war. The
company's response was to exert an ever tightening squeeze on its hapless
labour tenants, leading to increasingly strained relations on its farms and
on its mines. It was no doubt fortunate for the memory of Kobeng, that he
114
passed away in 1915.
The 'flu epidemic brought the company's problems to a head, prompting
its General Manager, R.A. Barry, to lead a deputation to Pretoria to wait on
115the Ministers of Justice and Native Affairs. In these meetings Barry
presented four main demands: that the SNC be 'more of a Chief and less of a
Tax gatherer' and thereby gain the confidence of the African inhabitants
in the district; that labour recruitment for outside districts be
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'absolutely prohibited1; that the 'disappearance of natives' be stopped
through a modified pass sytem; and that police supervision be made
efficient and extended in the district. In later discussions with Acting
Director of Native Labour, H.S. Cooke, the TGME also submitted a further
thirty recommendations on how to reduce labour 'wastage' and to secure the
available labour for the mines. Amongst the most important of these were,
to hunt down hut tax defaulters, to discipline beer brewers, to penalise
land companies which allowed Africans to congregate on their farms, to stop
119illegal squatting, to compound women and to punish desertion heavily.
For a time it looked as if Barry had over-reached himself by his rash
descent on the capital. Although Cooke was on the whole sympathetic to the
plight of the company and endorsed most of its requests, other officials
120took the opportunity to settle a few scores with its overbearing Manager.
Damant, the Native Commissioner, for example, recommended proclaiming
Pilgrim's Rest a labour district in terms of Act 15 of 1911, an issue
carefully skirted by Cooke. He also expressed himself totally opposed to
closing the district to outside recruiting, even on a temporary basis as
26.
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suggested by Cooke. Damant re-stated his position at a meeting between
the Police and Native Affairs Department officials in Pretoria 2Y2 months
later, on which occasion he found strong support from Colonel Truter, the
Commissioner of Police. 'Natives were being swindled right and left1 Truter
argued, while mere 'picannins' were being sent underground. The 1911 Act,
he believed, should be enforced, and children should not be allowed
underground below the age of 16. Colonel Godley, the under-secretary of
native affairs threw his hands up in horror at this turn of the debate.
'There will be shouting from the mine-owners' he exclaimed, and tried vainly
122to rally support for the weaker 'Barberton' option.
And shouting there certainly was. Once rumours reached Pilgrim's Rest
that the Native Labour Regulations Act might be enforced on the district
Barry both wired and wrote the Secretary for Native Affairs in great
agitation. Enforcement he claimed 'would be a real hardship'; it would
have 'serious results' and could 'do nothing but harm the district generally
123
... the Government interests, and ... the natives themselves'. Shortly
after, a new deputation waited on the Mining Commissioner for Pilgrim's
Rest. The threatened enforcement of the 1911 Act, Barry argued would
'severely jeopardise1 the company's operations. A key problem was its
restrictions on the employment of youths. Between 1 200 and 1 500 juveniles
were employed by TGME, and these often meant the difference between profit
and loss on the company's small low grade mines. Rather than exploiting
child labour, he intimated, the mines were performing a valuable social
service, since the youth would otherwise find 'an outlet in criminal and
124loafing channels'. A more sympathetic attitude from the Government was
urgently required.
It is not clear from the evidence how this conflict played itself out,
but it seems that Barry's protests and the Secretary for Native Affairs'
caution were eventually enough to block any radical change. No 'fresh
27.
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regulations' were implemented; the Company continued to enforce labour
1 PR
contracts without reference to the Native Affairs officials; and,
throughout 1919, African men persisted in *wander[ing] about the country in
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perfectly undisciplined manner*. The Company continued to insist that
their labour shortages were due to problems of control rather than lack of
potential employees. As Barry wrote in his quarterly report to the
Secretaries in October 1919:
There appears to be a considerable force of available but idle native
labour in the district, which rigid native policy and some attention
to administrative needs should place at the disposal of mines and
• A 4- • 1 2 8other industries.
However, if a rigid native policy meant the application of the 1911 Act,
Barry preferred to rely on his own resources. In the ensuing months he
placed his compound police at the disposal of the sub-native commissioner to
129
track down deserters, he attempted to discipline deserters by withholding
130
wages, and he had squatters flogged to compel them to come and work on
the farms.
By these means a satisfactory supply of labour was gradually restored,
and the issue of a 'more rigid native policy1 slowly slid out of view.
Other issues were in any case by now claiming the attention of the manager
of TGME. When Barry had conducted his investigation in Pilgrim's Rest in
December 1918, the one complaint that he had received from black labourers
on the mines was over the issue of wages. Since 1917 the rate of inflation
132had soared, and black living standards had become progressively eroded.
Faced with escalating costs for stores and equipment, the one thing the TGME
wished to avoid were increases in black pay. In 1919, for example, there
was a strong move among the shareholders of the company to cancel
prospecting operations altogether as a means of cutting costs, which the
133
chairman only barely warded off. Again the following year, when fears
were abroad that the gold premium night suddenly drop 'considerable
pressure' was brought to bear on Barry 'by the Chairman and others to reduce
28.
expenditure and outlay, at the cost of stopping work that [Barry] thought to
be necessary1-*. Clearly this was not the moment when wage increases for
blacks would be readily conceded.
A small concession was made after the black mineworkers' strike on the
Rand in February 1920. Although Barry spoke of the company's good fortune
in having 'avoided serious native trouble such as that on the Rand1 in the
1920 Company Report, he also took the precaution of granting a bonus of one
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month's pay to underground workers after six months' continuous work.
However, this soon proved insufficient. The first intimation of impending
trouble came from mines in nearby Sabie, which had failed to follow the
TGME's example and had granted no increase of any kind. On 11th May, the
Sabie branch of the Transvaal Native Congress approached sub-native
commissioner Hook in his Graskop office to protest that black wages were the
same as they had been before the war, and to request an increase in pay.
Hook conveyed this message to the managers of Sabie's mines, but no
immediate action was forthcoming, and between 17-20 May workers on all of
Sabie's main mines came out successively on strike. With the exception of
Buchanan Syndicate, the strikes only lasted one day, after workers were
granted bonuses equivalent to those paid at TGME.
Buoyed up by this small victory the Transvaal Native Congress now
spread its actions further afield, and began actively recruiting around
Pilgrim's Rest. Jubilee Kok recalls the Transvaal Native Congress' brass
band parading through the streets of Pilgrim's Rest location, and hundreds
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of residents purchasing the TNC's white membership card. The company
meanwhile looked on in alarm. Local white opinion advocated harsh measures
against the Congress, but ultimately wiser counsels prevailed. The TGME
owned Pilgrim's and Sabie News counselled a policy of 'peaceful persuasion',
on the grounds that 'in a district such as ours control by force is
impossible'. Perhaps recalling the damage done by Barry's and others'
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149before. The name of 'Bob' Gardner, the company's estate manager, became
a byword for brutality on the TGME's farms, as he flogged men and arrested
women for not furnishing labour in the right quantities or at the right
time. As the company strove to increase tonnage and reduce costs, Sunday
work became common, which closed down further spaces that had previously
helped humanise the labour regime. There are also signs that more and
more tenants were squeezed on the company's farms. The only hard evidence
is provided by Mabin, who speaks of the numbers of families residing on the
company's six most densely settled Pilgrim's Rest farms rising from 395 in
1934 to 726 in 1945, but oral testimony suggests this may also have been
152happening before. 'This was when our lands were cut1 says July Sedibe:
153henceforth polygamy, cattle and ploughs were gradually whittled away.
The old collaborative relationships could hardly survive in this
hostile environment. In the late 1920s, the Industrial and Commercial
Workers' Union (ICU) began to recruit on the farms tapping this mounting
discontent. 'The ICU told us not to pay rent and tax, and Bob Gardner
chased them off July Sedibe recalls. Along with scores of others he
purchased a membership card. Reprisals were common - 'If Gardner found you
[with a card] he would handcuff you' and take you off, but grievances
154
abounded and many were prepared to take the risk. Even Chaana, Kobeng's
155
successor turned a blind eye to the ICU organisers on the farm. It was
perhaps because of the ICU's activities that 1929 was a year of such wild
156fluctuations of labour. However, as with other rural communities in the
Transvaal, the ICU promised far more than they could deliver. 'They sang a
157
song called "Africa"1 but failed to do much else, and within months the
agitation had collapsed. One legacy of its work is perhaps to be found in
the deposition and exile of Chief Chaane in 1932, reportedly because he
opposed Sunday work. With this, for the TGME's tenants, the old order
had passed.
FOOTNOTES
1. See, e.g., C. van Onselen, Chibaro (Johannesburg, 1980), 227-229;
S. Marks and S. Trapido 'Lord Milner and the South African State1,
History Workshop, 8, Autumn 1979.
2. For some of the opening shots in an extensive debate see D.E. Kaplan
'Class Conflict, Capital Accumulation and the State: An Historical
Analysis of the State in Twentieth Century South Africa. Ph.D.,
University of Sussex, 1977; D. O'Meara Volkskapitisme (Johannesburg,
1983); Davies R., Kaplan, D., Morris, M. and O'Meara, D. 'Class
Struggle and a Periodisation of the State in South Africa • Review of
African Political Economy, 7.
3.
4. van Onselen, Chibaro, 25, 33, 91-127.
5. ibid, 91-127.
6. R. Edgecombe, 'The Token System: Labour Acquisition and Control in the
Natal Collieries, 1911-1956, paper presented to the History Workshop
Conference on The Making of Class 9-14 Feb., 1987, 1-32 especially, 5.
7. Church of the Province of South Africa Archives, University of the
Witwatersrand (hereafter CPSA). Minutes of Evidence to the Native Laws
Commission of Enquiry (Fagan Commission) 1947, Vol. 44, Mr Barrett,
Chamber of Mines, 4040.
8. S. Trapido, 'Putting a Plough to the Ground: A History of Tenant
Production on the Vereeniging Estates, 1896-1920' in W. Beinart,
P. Delius and S. Trapido (eds.). Putting a Plough to the Ground,
Johannesburg, 1986.
2.
9. In 1916, for example, the TGME and Glynn's combined produced £816,000
worth of gold out of a total of £39 million produced in South Africa,
the overwhelming bulk from the Rand.- TGME Archives, Pilgrim's Rest
(hereafter TGME) General Notebook, May 1916-July 1917. R.A. Barry to
the Secretaries, TGME, 25 May 1917, 885-7.
10. A.P. Cartwright, Valley of Gold (Cape Town, 1961); A.R.C. Fowler,
•Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates, Limited, 1872-1967', Journal
of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, February, 1968,
297-308.
11. Head Office Notebook, 20 April 1915-20 April 1916, Acting General
Manager, G. Carter to Secretaries, TGME, 12 August 1915; Head Office
Notebook, 11 July 1917-6November 1918, General Manager to Secretaries,
TGME 4 Oct. 1917, 215-6; Head Office Notebook 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920,
General Manager to Secretaries, TGME, 11 Sept. 1919, 399; Barlow Rand
Archive (hereafter BRA), TGME Annual Reports, 1915, 14.
12. A.R.C. Fowler, 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 296.
13. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1909, 16-18.
14. Ibid, 1925, 13; 1926, 9.
15. Ibid, 1908, 14, 28; 1910; 1924; 1927, 3.
16. Ibid. 1921, 3, 5. All deficiencies in this paper can be attributed to
this.
17. TGME, Mrs Gladys I Barry's Diaries Jan. 1915-June 1017, Vol. I 12-13 May
1915.
18. Registrar of Companies, Pretoria, TGME "Diamond Jubilee 1895-1955, 3.
19. CAD, GG 1411 44/25 J. Allies and A.A. Menkin Pilgrim's Rest Vigilance
Association to the Governor General 29 May 1915.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, Vigilance Association (2) to the Governor General, 26 May 1915.
3.
22. Ibid., Minutes on the folder cover to the Vigilance Association's
correspondence; ibid., minute 912 Prime Minister's Office, 20 July
1915.
23. TGME, head Office Notebook, 20 April 1915-20 April 1916, Barry to H.C.
Boyd, 9 Nov. 1915, 569; General Notebook May 1916-July 1917, Barry to
Boyd, 15 June 1916, 146-158; ibid, 20 Feb. 1920-28 Jan. 1921, Barry to
J.L. Shurink, 7 June 1916, 168.
24. TGME, Head Office Notebook, 20 April 1915-20 April 1916, Barry to
Secretaries TGME, 17 Sept. 1915, 420; ibid, 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920,
Barry to Secretaries, TGME, 18 March 1920.
25. TGME, Part of File 5EH, SAMWU, du Toit, Secretary, Miners' Union,
Pilgrim's Rest to Acting General Manager, TGME, 29 Dec. 1919; ibid,
Acting General Manager to du Toit, 30 Dec. 1919; ibid, du Toit to
Normand, 3 Jan 1920; ibid, Barry to Secretaries, TGME, 23 Jan. 1920.
26. Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines, p.66; TGME Head Ofice 5
Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, "Statement of staff and general employees as at
end June 1919", Signed Mine Secretary, Duncan; ibid, Head Office
Notebook 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, p.907; Head Office Notebook, 11 July
1917-6 Nov. 1918, Barry to Secretaries, TGME, 4 Dec. 1917, 336.
27. TGME General Notebook 3 May 1914-28 June 1926, Acting General Manager,
Carter, to Secretaries, TGME, 4 April 1914.
28. Ibid., 26 Feb. 1920-28 Jan. 1921, Barry to J.T. Wright, 23 March 1920,
94.
29. Ibid, Head Office Notebook, 11 July 1917-6 Nov. 1918, Barry to
Secretaries, TGME, 15 August 1917, 107.
30. Ibid., b Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Normand to Secretaries, TGME, 8 Feb.
1919, 166.
31. TGME, part of File 5EH, SAMWU, Barry to J. Moyle-Phillips, Acting
Honorary Secretary, SAMWU, 27 Sept. 1920; ibid, Barry to
Moyle-Phillips, 4 Nov. 1920.
4.
32. See, e.g. P.V. Fishback, 'Did Coal Miners "Owe Their Souls to the
Company Store"? Theory and Evidence from the Early 1900s1 Journal of
Economic History, vol, XLVI, December 1986, No. 4.
33. See Note. 31.
34. By 1915-1920, the TGME seemed to have sold three farms. A. Barry in
evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Native Land Committee of 1918, noted
that the Company owned 29 farms. Minutes of Evidence to the Eastern
Transvaal Native Land Committee (UG32-'18), 44; Registrar of Companies,
"Transvaal Gold Mining Estates, Ltd. Report of the Directors and
Statement of Accounts for the year ended 31st December 1954; "Diamond
Jubilee 1895-1955", 3-4; Registrar of Companies, "Supplementary
Articles of Association of the Lydenburg Mining Estates Ltd.;
Cartwright, Valley of Gold, 13-19; A.R.C. Fowler, "Mining at the
Transvaal Gold Mining Estates", Feb. 1968, 193; Pilgrim's Rest
Archives, General Letterbook 17 Jan 1916-28 July 1916. General Manager
to Mining Commissioner, Pilgrim's Rest, 12 Feb. 1916, 142.
35. A. Mabin, 'Labour Tenancy and the Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest',
paper presented to the African Studies Seminar, African Studies
Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 10 June 1985, 6.
36. Minutes of Evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission UG32-'18,
39, 44.
37. CPSA, Evidence to the Native Economic Commission, 1931-2, BO+10, Reply
to Questionnaire No. 64/276(4), from Zoutpansberg (n.d.); ibid,
Magistrate and Native Commissioner Lydenburg, reply to questionnaire 24
March 1931.
38. Central Archives Depot (hereafter CAD), Government Native Labour Bureau
(hereafter GNLB) 303 402/18/98, Dyke Poynter to Secretary Mines and
Industries, 29 April 1919.
39. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F634, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13
March 1919; CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke Acting Director of
Native Affairs to Secretary for Native Affairs, 31 Dec. 1918.
5.
40. Ibid; A.R.C. Fowler, 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 302;
CAD, NTS 271, 1190/16/F634, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13
March 1919.
41. A.H. Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy
(Johannesburg, 1985) (Chap. 6).
42. TGME, Vaalhoek Mine, monthly reports, 7 June 1918-Dec 1925; Elandsdrift
Mine Annual Reports 2A1 Dec 1918-April 1926
43. TGME, Elandsdrift Mine Annual Reports 2S1, Dec. 1918-April 1926, 4 July
1917, 10 Nov 1920, 11 Dec. 1920.
44. Interview, Christian Silikane Shatale (near Bushbuckridge), 21 Feb.
1985.
45. Minutes of Evidence to the Eastern Transvaal Land Commission, UG32-'18,
40-42.
46. CPSA, Evidence to the Native Economic Commission, 1931-2, Box 10, Reply
to General Questionnaire tendered by Assistant Native Commissioner,
Graskop (n.d.).
47. Interview, Christian Silikane.
48. CAD, GNLB 402/18/98, to H.S. Cooke, 28 Dec. 1918.
49. Union of South Africa, Low Grade Mines Commission, UG.34-'2O, para. 18.
50. CAD, NTS 271, 1190/16/F639 H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs
31 Dec 1918; Interview, Tiger Mashile, Pilgrim's Rest.
51. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, F.H. Damant to Secretary for Nastive Affairs,
8 April 1918.
52. For the ownership of the local press, see TGME, General Notebook, 10
Sept. 1918-20 May 1919, Barry to Registrar, Transvaal Society of
Accountants, Johannesburg, 27 Sep. 1918, 62-8.
53. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Minutes of a Conference held at SAP
headquarters, Pretoria 24 Feb. 1919; ibid, F.C. Cabe for Under
Secretary Native Affairs to Secretary for Justice, 26 Feb. 1919.
54. CAD GNLB 402/18/98 Cooke to Whitelaw, 27 Dec. 1918.
6.
55. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, undated memorandum re administration of Native
Affairs at Pilgrim's Rest.
56. Ibid, Memorandum, initialled F.C.C. 27 March 1919.
57. TGME, General Notebook, 3 Sept 1914-9-July 1915, Estate Agent to General
Manager, TGME 22 May 1915, 852; CAD, GNLB, 303 402/18/98 Minutes of a
Conference at SAP headquarters, 24 Feb. 1919. See also note 55.
58. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F693, Report by D. Hook, sub-native commissioner,
Pilgrim's Rest, 21 Jan. 1919.
59. Ibid.
60. CAD NTS 271 1190/16/F639; Memo (by Soames) on illegal floggings by
members of the NAD during 1916 and 1918; ibid report on alleged
mal-administration at Graskop R.C. Cochran, Magistrate, n.d-
61. Ibid; Natal Advertiser 20 June 1918, 3 July 1918 (editorial); CAD NTS
271 1190/16/F639 Merriman to Botha 10 June 1918, Brebner to Dower 13
August 1918.
62. Ibid, Report on alleged mal-administration at Graskop, R.C. Cochran,
magistrate, n.d.
63. Ibid: telegram 24 January 1919.
64. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Notes of a meeting held between the Director of
Native Labour and a Deputation of Residents of Pilgrim's Rest, 27 Nov.
1918.
65. BRA, TGME annual Reports, 1907.
66. TGME, Head Office Notebook, 11 July 1917-6 Nov. 1918, Barry to
Secretaries TGME, 10 Dec. 1917.
67. For a general account of Spanish 'flu in South Africa see H. Phillips,
TGME, Letter Book 16 Head Office 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to
Chairman 5 Nov. 1918.
68. Ibid, Barry to Secretaries 17 Oct. 1918.




72. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, F.H. Damant Native Commissioner, Lydenburg to
Secretary for Native Affairs, 1 Feb. 1919.
73. Interview, Christian Silikane, Shatale, 21 Feb. 1985.
74. Interview, July Sedibe, Pilgrim's Rest.
75. Interview, Christian Silikane.
76. TGME, Head Office Notebook, 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920. General Manager
to Secretaries, TGME, 10 Jan. 1919, 75; ibid, Barry to Secretaries 11
Feb. 1919, 115-9.
77. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1919, 4; 1920 (May) 4.
78. TGME, General Notebook, 10 Sept. 1918-20 May 1919, Barry to Magistrate,
Pilgrim's Rest 31 Oct, 1918, 255-6, Barry to Shurink, 3 Dec. 1918, 344;
CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs.
79. Barry, TGME Annual Reports, 1912.
80. CAD, NTS 271 119D/16/F639. H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs,
31 Dec. 1918
81. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Trevar to Govt. Mining Engineer, 5 May 1919.
82. See note 80.
83. See notes 42 and 43.
84. Interview July Sedibe.
85. Interview Christian Silikane.
86. Interview Tiger Mashile.
87. Interview July Sedibe.
88. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F693, Report by D. Hook, 21 Jan. 1917.
89. CAD, GNLB 303 402/18/98, Notes of a meeting held between the Director of
Native Labour and a deputation of residents of Pilgrim's Rest, 27 Nov.
1918.
90. Interview, July Sedibe.
91. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs,
31 Dec. 1918.
8.
92. CPSA, Evidence to the Native Economic Commission, 1931-2, Box 10, Reply
to General Questionnaire, tendered by Assistant Native Commissioner,
Graskop (n.d.).
93. Interview Christian Silkane.
94. See note 92.
95. Interview, July Sedibe.
96. Interview, Christian Silikane.
97. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs,
31 Dec. 1918.
98. Ibid, Chairman of Deputation (Pilgrim,'s Rest) to Secretary for Native
Affairs, 20 Feb. 1919.
99. CAD, GNLB, 402/18/98, Trevor to Govt. Mining Engineer, 9 May 1919.
100. BRA, TGME Annual Reports 1908, 13; 1909.
101. Ibid, 1910, 34.
102. Union of South Africa, Minutes of Evidence to the Eastern Transvaal
Land Commission, UG.32-'18, 44.
103. Ibid, 41-2.
104. Interview, July Sedibe.
105. A. Mabin, The Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest.
106. Interview, Chief L.L. Mogane and others, Hlabekisa, 22 Feb. 1985.
107. Interview Christian Silikane; interview July Sedibe; interview
Jubilee Kok 22 Feb. 1985.
108. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1911, 3, 6; 1912, 37.
109. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 'Summary of Results Since Commencement of
Milling Operations', 1895-1932.
110. A.R.C. Fowler, 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 296.
111. See note 109.
112. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1929; 1930, 6.
113. P.L. Bonner, 'The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920; the
radicalisation of a black petty bourgeoisie on the Rand in S. Marks and
S. Trapido (eds.) Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa.
9.
114. Mabin, 'Labour Tenancy and the Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest1, 7.
115. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639, H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs
31 Dec. 1918; ibid, Chairman of Deputation to Secretary for Native
Affairs, 20 Feb. 1919.
116. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98 'Memorandum to Major Cooke ...' 3 Dec. 1918.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid, 'Notes re natives for discussion with Mr. Cooke, Special
Commissioner, 5 Dec. 1918.
120. CAD, NTS 271 1190/16/F639 H.S. Cooke to Secretary for Native Affairs 31
Dec. 1918.
121. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98 Damant to Secretary for Native Affairs 11 Feb.
1919.
122. Notes taken at a Conference held at the SAP headquarters, Pretoria, 24
Feb. 1919.
123. CAD, NTS, 271 1190/16/G634, Barry to Secretary for Native Affairs 13
March 1919.
124. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/988. J. Hartley to Under Secretary Native Affairs
7 May 1919, encl. W. Dyke Poynter to Secretary, Mines and Industries,
24 April 1919.
125. TGME, Head Office Notebook, Nov. 1918-Nov. 1920 General Manager to
Secretaries, TGME, 9 April 1919, 177.
126. TGME, General Notebook 19 Oct. 1919-20 May 1919, Normand to Messrs.
Francis and Gold, 18 Jan. 1919, 529; ibid, Barry to Giles, 11 Feb.
1919, 648-9.
127. TGME, Head Office Notebook, 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to
Secretaries TGME, 11 Sep. 1919; ibid, Barry to Secretaries, 7 Aug.
1919.
128. Ibid, Barry to Secretaries, TGME 7 Oct. 1919, 422; ibid, Barry to
Secretaries, TGME, 13 Jan. 1920.
10.
129. General Notebook 21 May 1919-25 Feb. 1920, Barry to SNC, Graskop 29
Nov. 1919.
130. General Notebook 10 Sept. 1918-20 May 1919, Barry to SNC 5 Feb. 1919;
ibid, Barry to Acting SNC, 17 Mar. 1919.
131. CAD GNLB 303 402/18/98, Memorandum 27 Mar. 1919. Initialled F.C.C.
132. Bonner, 'The Transvaal Native Congress' 273-6.
133. A.R.C. Fowler 'Mining at Transvaal Gold Mining Estates', 293.
134. TGME Head Office Notebook 16, 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to
Chairman TGME, 20 Sep. 1920, 898.
135. TGME Head Office Notebook 5 Nov. 1918-2 Nov. 1920 Barry to
Secretaries, TGME 10 Feb. 1920; BRA, TGME, Annual Reports, 1920, 4.
136. CAD, MNW 527 2338/20, D.W. Hook Sub-Native Commissioner Graskop to
Native Commissioner Lydenburg, 25 May 1920.
137. Interview, Jubilee book.
138. The Pilgrims and Sabie News 18 June 1920.
139. CAD MNW 527 2338/20, Poyter, Mining Commissioner to Secretary, Mines
and Industries, 6 July 1920.
140. Ibid.
141. TGME Head Office Notebook, 14 Nov. 1920-22 May 1922, Barry to
Secretaries, TGME, 16 Feb. 1921.
142. TGME, Head Office Notebook, 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov 1920, Barry to Chairman,
TGME, 2Q Sep. 1920.
143. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1921, 2; 1924; 1925, 13.
144. TGME, Head Office Notebook 5 Nov. 1918-23 Nov. 1920, Barry to Chairman
20 Sep. 1920.
145. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1929.
146. Ibid, 1909, 7; ibid, 1927; ibid, 1930.




150. Ibid, 1924, 1928, 1929; Interview Chief L.L. Mogane and others.
151. Ibid.
152. Mabin, 'The Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest1, 404.
153. Interview July Ledibe.
154. Ibid.
155. Interview, Tiger Mashile.
156. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1929, 3, 5.
157. Interview, Tiger Mashile.
158. Mabin, 'Labour Tenancy and Land Clearances at Pilgrim's Rest1, 9.;
Interview, Chief L.L. Mogane and others.

